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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ELLIS R. BLACKWELL % 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 900262-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 1990). This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling 
that the results of a urinalysis submitted to as a condition of 
defendant's parole agreement may be used to substantiate a new 
and independent charge. In reviewing the denial of a motion to 
suppress, this Court applies a clearly erroneous standard to the 
trial court's factual evaluations because "[t]he trial court is 
in the best position to assess the credibility and accuracy of 
the witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . " State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d 
(Utah 1989) (citations omitted). However, in reviewing the trial 
court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings, this 
Court applies a correction of error standard. Id, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IVs 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and not Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons ox-
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ellis R. Blackwell, was charged on December 
13, 1989, with possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 
1990); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1990); theft of a 
motor vehicle, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-1-109 (1990); and improper registration, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-142 (Supp. 
1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 1). 
On January 31, 1989, defense counsel filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from a vehicle in which defendant 
was a passenger (R. at 21). Additionally, defendant filed a pro 
se motion to suppress and motion to dismiss (R. at 23-27). A 
suppression hearing was held February 5, 1990 (R. at 29). 
Based on the evidence and memoranda of law submitted by both 
parties, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress in 
a ruling signed February 27, 1990 (R. at 32-37, 40-42, 90). 
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At the pretrial conference on April 13, 1990, defendant 
negotiated a plea agreement whereby he withdrew his former plea 
of not guilty and entered a guilty plea to Count I, possession of 
a controlled substance, as a third degree felony (R. at 107). 
Based on the plea, the State moved to dismiss Counts II, III, and 
IV (R. at 107). Also at this time, defendant filed a Statement 
in Advance of Plea of Guilty in which he preserved his right to 
appeal the court's suppression ruling (R. at 109-114). Defendant 
was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in 
the Utah State Prison to be served concurrently with a previous 
sentence, and received credit for time served (R. at 115-116). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 7, 1989, defendant, a fugitive parolee, was 
apprehended by his parole officer (R. at 40). Methamphetamine 
was discovered during a search of the vehicle in which defendant 
had been a passenger (R. at 40). Defendant consented to submit 
to a urinalysis, pursuant to a condition of his parole agreement, 
which revealed the existence of methamphetamine in defendant's 
system (R. at 43; see Addendum A for Parole Agreement). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The scope of defendant's parole agreement which 
expressly provided for random urinalysis was not exceeded when 
the urinalysis results were introduced against him in a criminal 
prosecution for possession of a controlled substance. The Utah 
Supreme Court has expressly noted that evidence obtained by a 
parole officer is not made unlawful simply because it is turned 
over to the police and used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
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Furthermore, a urinalysis is nontestimonial evidence which does 
not trigger the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS PROPER. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress the results of a urinalysis he submitted 
to as a condition of his parole agreement on the ground that the 
evidence was obtained in violation of his fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination. Although defendant concedes that 
the evidence was admissible for purposes within the scope of his 
parole agreement, he contends it was not admissible to 
substantiate a new and independent charge (Br. of App. 4, 6). 
Defendant's assertions misconstrue pertinent case law and reflect 
a misunderstanding of the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination . 
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not 
triggered by nontestimonial evidence; rather, it is a bar against 
compelling communications or testimony. Oregon v, Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 764 (1966) (state may force a defendant to submit to a 
blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant's fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination)). Following the lead 
of Schmerber, the Utah Supreme Court has similarly held that a 
breath sample is noncommunicative in itself and that there is no 
self-incrimination violation if the defendant is compelled to 
provide such evidence. Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 140 
n. 18 (Utah 1987) (citing American Fork City v. Crosgrovef 701 
P.2d 1069, 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) (holding that the fifth 
amendment does not prevent the state from obtaining real or 
physical evidence from an accused without his consent)). Like 
the breath sample in Larson/ the urine sample in the present case 
simply fails to implicate defendant's fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. Furthermore, defendant appears to 
overconstrue the fifth amendment case law which does not prohibit 
all self-incriminating statements of a parolee or probationer to 
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Contrary to defendant's assertion, the scope of his 
parole agreement was not violated by use of the urinalysis 
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution for possession 
o 
of a controlled substance. A parolee's rights are not governed 
by the same standards that govern the privacy rights of 
individuals not subject to the supervisory control of the state. 
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1983). Rather, a 
parolee's "rights are affected and modified by the necessary 
power that the state must have over parolees to administer 
successfully the parole system as a controlled passageway between 
prison and freedom." Ld. While parolees are entitled to some 
expectation of privacy, that expectation does not generally 
Cont. his parole or probation officer from use in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding. See e.g. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 
(1984) (concluding that probationer failed to timely assert his 
fifth amendment privilege; therefore, his disclosures were not 
compelled incriminations and could be used against him in a 
criminal prosecution). 
2 
Defendant asserts that he was told the results of the 
urinalysis would not be used against him in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution; however, the record is totally devoid of any support 
for his assertion. Upon learning of defendant's allegation, the 
State filed a motion to stay the trial court's decision on the 
suppression motion and to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the statement was made (R. 38). The State's 
motion indicated that it would honor a promise not to prosecute 
if the trial court determined that such a promise had in fact 
been given. The trial court's ruling on the suppression motion 
came down the same day the State filed its motion to stay the 
proceedings on February 27, 1989 and did not expressly address 
the issue of whether the promise had been made. Although a 
hearing on the matter was held March 2, 1989, defendant has not 
supplied a transcript of the hearing on appeal. Because 
defendant has failed to supply this transcript or other record 
support for his assertion that he was told that the urinalysis 
would not be used in an independent criminal prosecution, this 
court "must assume the regularity of the proceedings below and 
affirm the judgment." State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 
1985). 
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require a warrant based on probable cause. IxL at 1260. A 
parole officer may conduct a lawful search without a search 
warrant if the parole officer has "reasonable grounds for 
investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of his 
parole or committed a crime." j[d.; State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 
1069, 1072 (Utah 1987). See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 
880 (1987) (upholding search of probationer's residence as 
"reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment because 
it was conducted pursuant to a valid state regulation permitting 
any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a 
warrant as long as there are "reasonable grounds"). 
Although defendant's parole agreement expressly 
provided for random urinalysis as a condition of his parole, this 
urinalysis was not random. Defendant was required to submit to a 
urinalysis only after having been apprehended as a fugitive 
parolee. Thus, the urinalysis was clearly reasonable and related 
to the purposes of defendant's parole agreement. Furthermore, 
the Utah Supreme Court has expressly noted that a parole 
officer's search of a parolee is not made unlawful "because 
evidence incriminciting to the parolee is turned over to the 
police and used in a criminal prosecution." State v. Velasquez, 
672 P.2d at 1262 (citing United States ex rel. Santos v. New York 
State Board of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972); Seim v. State, 94 Nev. 89, 590 P.2d 
1152 (1979)). See also Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 252, 
253 (9th Cir.) (parolee's contention that evidence could only be 
used in a parole revocation hearing held to be without merit), 
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cert, denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).3 Similarly, defendant's 
urinalysis was not made unlawful because it was used as evidence 
in his subsequent prosecution for possession of a controlled 
substance. Defendant's assertions to the contrary are simply 
unsupported by the applicable case law. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the above, the State respectfully requests 
that defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
DATED this (_ day of February, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
IflAN DECKER ~***~~ 
Assistant Attorney General 
3 
Furthermore, it is implicit in the following cases that 
evidence obtained pursuant to a search by a parole or probation 
officer may be used to substantiate a subsequent criminal 
prosecution: Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) 
(conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon based on 
evidence obtained during probation officer's search of 
probationer's home); Toomey v. Bunnellf 898 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.), 
(conviction for armed robbery and other offenses based on parole 
officer's search of defendant's trunk), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 
390 (1990); United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(conviction for alteration of a money order based on deception 
exemplars procured by parole officer); Pena v. Statey 792 P.2d 
1352 (Wyo. 1990) (conviction for conspiracy to deliver cocaine 
and other offenses based on evidence obtained during parole 
officer's search of parolee's home). 
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ADDENDUM A 
MEMBERS 
PAUL W BOYDEN 
VICTORIA J PALAOOS 
GARY L WEBSTER 
PAUL W SHEFFIELO 
Administrator 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAROLE AGREEMENT 
I, ELLIS RAY BLACKWELL, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State 
Corrections, according "to tnis Agreement. 
I furcner agree to abide by ali conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any 
additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent with the 
laws of tne State of Utan. I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any 
conditions thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing 
my parole to be revoked or my parole period to start over. 
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE 
1. RELEASE: 
2. RESIDENCE: 
3. CONDUCT: 
4. REPORT: 
5. EMPLOYMENT: 
6. SEARCH: 
7. WEAPONS: 
On the day of my.release from the institution or confinement* I will 
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing. 
I shall establish and reside at a residence of record and shall report such 
residence or any change thereof to my Parole Agent. I shall not leave the 
State of Utah witnout prior written authorization from my Parole Agent. It 
is hereby acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written 
authorization from my Parole Agent, that I hereby waive extradition from any 
state in which I may be found, to the State of Utah. 
I snail obey ali State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all 
times. 
I .shall make written or in perspn reports to my Parole J^gent by the fifth 
of each and every month or as directed and I shall permit visits to my place 
of residence.as required.by my Parole Agent for the purpose of insuring 
compliance with the conditions of parole. 
I will see* and maintain full-time employment unless I am participating in 
an educational or therapy program approved by my Parole Agent. 
compliance with the conditions of my parole. insure 
.osives. , 
Annotated, 
8. ASSOCIATION: I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can 
reasonably be expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or 
illegal activity. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall: 9. 
1. Pay restitution of $399.75. 2. Submit to random urinalysis. 
3. Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy. 2^^'jZu*' S*;^•?'* 
4. Not consume or possess any alconol. 5. Successfully complete ISP Program. 
Amended 5/15/1989 
I nave read, understand and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of 
a copy of t^ is^ Agpeffiment 
JQ*/ this /^ day o f * ^ 3 u ^ , 19^ffS WITNESSED BY: 
TITLE: SIGNED: /fcgfr ^fg*&r^**^ 
Parolee 
ADDRESS: f&z/ 1& 
(&&*£+ j*£_ 
AA~«*--* -pzr 
